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The practical validation of the Cartel Law in Hungary can be reconstructed based on 
judicial practice. The existing memorials essentially only contain the verdicts of the courts 
of the first and second instances, and there are only a small number of archive sources 
that describe the factum in its entirety. Due to this, only the information found in the 
verdicts’ dispositional and justification portions can aid us in the examination of the rules 
of Procedural Law. All in all, it can be stated, by taking archival sources into account, that 
the peremptory majority of cartel cases were jurisdictional legal actions. The specialized 
nature of the procedural rules can be viewed as unique in the history of legal action in 
Hungary, for the civil courts reached verdicts by mainly employing the rules of Bp., 
according to Statute 68400/1914. I. M. Apart from the problems in the field of Substantive 
Law, we can observe the process of the lawsuits and the procedural acts, especially the act 
of verification. We can observe what data and information the courthouses used in order 
to reach their resolutions. I would like to present the regulation of the Hungarian cartel 
law special attention to the legal cases.1 
 





The rules and cases of the so-called legal actions of general interest in 
connection to the cartels were introduced by the 20th Act of 1931. According to the 
technical definition, the procedural law, as a specified aspect of Cartel Act, 
regulated the formal law so that the common good and the economy could benefit 
from it.2 The methodology of the cartel supervision offices belonged to this area of 
law, and it was practiced by the government, the specific ministries, the Royal 
Hungarian Legal Board, the Cartel Committee, and the Price Analysing 
Committee from the executive branch, and the regular, elected, and Cartel Court 
from the judicial branch.3 In this essay, I describe the dispositions in connection to 
the procedural law of the Cartel Court, and with that, to analyse the existing legal 
precedents. 
The Cartel Court was introduced after the law came into effect, and it was 
reasoned by the statement of the Secretary of Agriculture: The “measures which 
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must be taken against a cartel should be objected to the consideration of a judge 
most of the times, so […] the judicature of the Cartel Act could best be assured by 
a separate cartel court”.4 
Should an agreement or a statement fall under Paragraph No. 1 of the 
aforementioned Act, then, according to the statement of the assigned secretary, the 
Royal Hungarian Legal Board could file a case at the Cartel Court.5 The problem 
of the definition of cartels by the courts arose in legal proceedings in connection to 
the agreements. To be more exact, the problem was what acts can be considered to 
be under the effects of Cartel Act.6 
The aforementioned understanding of the act became interpretable by 
practice. The Cartel Court examined an agreement that considered the acquisition, 
resale, sale price, and conditions of firewood, coal, charcoal, and forge coal, and 
also contained rules on its accounts and mutual buyer protection. The Cartel Court 
interpreted Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Act, and determined that the intention of 
the respondent was not to regulate the actions on one occasion but “defined the 
respondents‟ behaviour in the terms of business for a longer time period”. The 
point of the agreement was to regulate the economic competition “in connection to 
the commerce and formation of prices of these merchandises, between two 
subjects of free trade”.7 In its verdict, the Cartel Court stated that “such an 
agreement is under the effects of Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Act, with no 
consideration of its personal, economic or geographic field”.8 
The definition of common good and the interests of public economics was 
one of the most notable problems of the legal institutions that regulated cartels. 
The works of Ferenc Harasztosi Károly (among other literary sources) should be 
highlighted, which stated that “The state must establish a public law system for 
cartels, which ensures that the cartel disagreements of economic life are taking 
place within a framework which ensures that they do not endanger the interests of 
public economy and of common good”.9 
In this matter, we have to stress the first statement of principle of the Cartel 
Court (on the matter of business isolation, boycott, or exclusion).10 This statement 
– by referring to Paragraph No. 6 of the Cartel Act – established that it is against 
the common good and economic conditions “exclusion not only gives a party 
economically reasoned disadvantages, but in fact capable of destroying its 
complete economic existence”.11 In connection to this, the Cartel Court also 
examined the cartel contracts containing the stipulations of isolation. The Cartel 
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Court only agreed to enforce this if it had “reasons especially significant and 
relevant to the public”.12 According to the Cartel Court, “The emphasis is not so 
much on private, but general interests”.13 The committee referred to the 
justification of the 5th act of 1923: “The categorical imperatives of morals must 
also be validated during conflicts in the fields of commerce and industry, if one 
does not want to set individual selfishness loose on the trade”.14 In connection to 
both fair competition and cartel regulations, one must always keep the interests of 
common good in mind.15 The Curia also stated in Mandate No. IV. P. 4936/1927 
that any contract which is against general interests and good morals shall be 
considered null and void.16 
One could file a legal action to the Cartel Court if an agreement or an 
application of a regulation, or a cartel that was formed because of it, was against 
proper ethics or common good.17 A secretary could ask for several things in such 
actions: the court should disband a cartel formed by such an application or 
regulation, and make a pecuniary offence if it keeps on functioning. The secretary 
could also ask for forbidding the execution of the agreement or the regulation, and 
for a fine if the participants continue to pursue their goals.18 Filing a legal action 
introduced by the cartel court could be done by any office or individual by 
contacting the Secretary of Trade and providing ample evidence.19 Before filing 
the legal action, the secretary could ask for a second opinion from the Cartel 
Committee, but it was not compulsory. However, if a public office or authority 
filed the claim, the secretary usually turned to the Cartel Committee for their 
opinion. 
The administrative offices only practiced initiative rights during proceedings, 
and after this, taking measures were assigned to the court. The offices could 
participate in the legal action as a party to the dispute. All in all, it was in 
connection to the consideration of court independence and the guarantees of 
judicial proceedings, not to mention the respect of basic rights.20 
In a lawsuit based on a legal action of general interest, the court could decree 
the disbanding of the cartel, to shut down its operations, to forbid the fulfilment of 
an agreement or a regulation, or force them to cease a certain action or behaviour. 
The Act clearly stated what legal arrangements were within the jurisdiction of the 
government. This meant that in order to enforce these decrees, one did not need a 
court order. The secretary could enact these measures if the agreement or 
regulation enforced upon the cartel endangered economic or general interests, 
especially if it regulated the circulation of goods production or price formation in 
such a way that the interests of the customers, the entrepreneurs, or the 
manufacturers were harmed. 
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It was within the jurisdiction of the ministry to examine the case, and, if was 
deemed necessary, it could propose to register the data, to make inquiries, and 
submit official documents. With the participation of a commissioned emissary, it 
could examine the business conductions and business management, and by 
looking at the business records and other documents of a cartel in question. It 
could also question the members and the employees. In case the ministry opted for 
the suspension of the operations of a cartel, then it could try to reach a peaceful 
solution by holding a hearing for the concerned parties. If this method was not 
fruitful, then it could propose to the government to withdraw tax and customs 
discounts, and the exclusion from public contracts. These arrangements fell under 
the topic of industrial codes and transport rates, and this is how the government 
intended to stop the cartel from continuing such actions that were against general 
interests.21 Based on the suggestion of the Secretary of Commerce, the 
government could introduce these arrangements if none of the specified conditions 
dictated by the Act were present.22 
In cases where the ministry filed for the cancellation of an official permit 
without which the cartel could not continue its intended activities, then they had to 
turn to the court. The ministry could make a suggestion to the government to 
modify or nullify the customs items written down in the customs tariff. There is an 
archived example for the latter. The Alkaloida Chemical Factory Inc. wrote an 
official letter to the Hungarian Royal Central Customs Directory on 12 December 
1933, which stated that “For preparations, and in exchange for the exported 
amount of morphine intended for transformation, the morphine-derivates and their 
salts be imported customs-free”.23 Because of the emerged economic conditions, if 
everything else failed, the ministry could turn to the Cartel Court.24 After briefly 
describing the rules of conduct, the procedural law – mostly civil law – rules in 
connection to the cartels will be described in a much detailed fashion, and the legal 





The concept of a lawsuit of general interest was understood as a legal 
action started based on a claim filed by the Legal Board on the order of the 
secretary of commerce, with the possible purposes of disbanding a cartel or 
forbidding them to continue their operations; the suspension of the ongoing 
legal action, without taking into account whether it is held by an orderly or a 
court of arbitration; to determine whether or not the actions of a cartel are 
against the law; the annulment of the verdicts made by the specialized courts.25 
The question arose regarding in which cases one can pass a lawsuit of 
general interest. It can be stated that the general opinion was that if there was a 
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chance of that, the state should intervene. The aforementioned Paragraph No. 6 
of the Cartel Act determined these. This is not a taxative list, because the act 
mentioned above lists other cases for filing a statement in order to start a 
lawsuit of general interest in Paragraph No. 7. A statement could be claimed if 
the cartel‟s operations were against the law, public morals, or general decrees. 
Most of these types of cases were of private interest, and were held earlier by 
orderly courts or courts of arbitration of the chamber since they broke the law 
of fair trade. Among many others, some of these cases were lawsuits filed 
because of boycott or sale under price.26 It is questionable whether these cases 
could become lawsuits of general interest since the law was broken, or the acts 
in question also harm general interests. This is a significant matter, for in cases 
where competition laws were broken and no general interests were harmed, 
orderly courts had the jurisdiction. 
In my opinion – based on the understanding of the normative text, in order 
for a lawsuit of general interest to be filed to the Cartel Court, not only the law 
and public morals had to be broken, but also general interests.27 
I agree with the statement of Nándor Raschburg, according to which even 
the name of the lawsuit of general interest excludes the opportunity for a 
private proposal. The legal action was proposed by the Secretary of Trade at 
the Royal Hungarian Legal Board. This also indicated that not only the law and 
public morals had to be harmed, but also the general interests. The statement 
had to be filed to the Legal Board based on this. In the conviction, the Cartel 
Court‟s verdict had to determine the harm that came not only to the law and 
public morals, but to the general interest, as well.28 
The evasion of the Cartel Act was the purpose of the so-called “coal 
cartel”, where the coal merchants and the mines, the coal merchants and the 
medium vendors, and the MÁK and the Salgó reached an agreement. This 
contract resulted in a monopolistic situation in the coal supplies of Budapest, 
for ten wholesale merchants took on the obligation to purchase 37.500 
carriages of coal from two mines, which was almost the complete coal needs of 
Budapest for a whole year. The merchants were not allowed to sell any other 
coal. Because of this, any mines and merchants who were not involved in this 
contract got into a difficult position. Not to mention that if we look at the 
situation from the point of view of the consumers, they were forced to buy 
briquette. The purpose of the cartel was to sell the so-called powdered coal 
which was pent up.29 According to the viewpoint of the Cartel Committee, 
several elements of the cartel contract endangered common good and the 
interests of public economy, and as such, it falls under the effect of Paragraph 
No. 6 of the Cartel Act, and because of this, they requested a rise in prices, the 
elimination of the uncertain economic situation, the decrease of 
unemployment, stopping the cartel from gaining any advantages in the field of 
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public services, and the annulment of the disadvantaged position of the mines 
outside the cartel.30 
 
 
The Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Cartel Court 
 
Lawsuits of general interest, temporary measures, laying on of pecuniary fines 
per orderly punishment, forbiddance, nullification of the verdicts of elected courts, 
and the suspension of execution of the regulations of elected courts were within 
the jurisdiction of the Cartel Court.31 
The Cartel Court could only order the dissolution and the ban from ongoing 
operation of a cartel if a cartel‟s operations were against general interests and there 
was no other way of terminating it. The law gave the secretary the right to ask for 
a termination directly from the court, without authorizing any other means. 
However, the rights related to the termination could mean constraining basic 
rights, especially the right to fusion. But the constitutional rights could only be 
limited in special cases and with legal authority. Any other case would make the 
court‟s actions illegitimate, and it would have been measured by the arbitrary legal 
practice. 
With the dissolution of the cartel, the court generally forbade the cartel and its 
members to continue their operation. The dissolution of the cartel did not mean 
that the members would not keep up its operation by acting in unison. This meant 
that the only way that the verdict would come into effect is if the court forbade the 
cartel to practice their operation. 
There were cases where in spite of the fact that the cartel was dissolved, it 
kept on operating. The law did not forbid this per se, but in practice what this 
meant is as follows. The verdict of the court was only valid for the dissolution and 
the forbiddance of the operation of the cartel involved in the lawsuit. If a new 
cartel was formed based on a new treaty, then the former verdict did not come into 
effect there. A new legal action had to be taken against the operation of the new 
cartel, and new proof was needed that its operation is against general interests. 
However, in urgent cases, the secretary could place temporary solutions into 
effect. 
In cases where the misconducts of the cartel could be nullified by the 
fulfilment of an agreement or a decree, then this became the court‟s order. This 
was also the decision where the nullification for the statement of claim was filed. 
In spite of all this, if the statement only asked for the nullification of the agreement 
or the decree, then the court could not state the dissolution in its verdict. In these 
cases, the court would have overruled the statement of claim, which is against the 
1st Act of 1911 (Judicial Procedure Code, JPC from here on out). They only 
petitioned for the nullification of the operations or behaviour if the behaviour of 
the cartel could not be demonstrably correlated to an agreement.32 
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The structure of the Cartel Court was regulated by the Cartel Act itself 
(Paragraph No. 8). This court was a separate institution, which was established, 
interestingly enough, within the Supreme Court, the topmost institution within the 
ordinary judicial system with a president, two appointed judges, and two lay 
judges. Its head was the president of the Supreme Court, or an individual 
appointed by the Supreme Court: the vice president or one of the presiding judges 
of the Supreme Court. The two judges were invited by the presiding judge 
appointed by the Supreme Court and the president of the acting council by the two 
appointed judges. The two lay judges were selected by the president of the acting 
council from those ten specialists that were selected every three years from the list 
assembled by the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of Commerce, containing 
thirty names. The reason behind this was to ensure competency.33 
Lawsuits of general interests had to be delivered for all participants 
concerned. In cases where representatives were announced or appointed, then the 
statements had to be delivered to this individual. In these legal actions, any 
participants could participate separately, and accompanied by their legal 
representatives. 
In order to ensure a professional opinion, the court could meet with the Cartel 
Committee ex officio. If it proved to be necessary, the Cartel Committee could do 
the same with the Price Analysation Council.34 For example, they followed this 
procedure in the case of the so-called tin box cartel, in order for the matter to be 
properly examined. The Cartel Committee called on the Price Analysation Council 
in order to proceed with the run-down of the prices of some “cartelised 
commodities”. For example, hemp, string, and canvas belonged to this group. 
There were some agricultural tools on the list, as well, for example, spits, hacks, 
and shovels.35 The Cartel Committee took the report of the Price Analysation 
Council into account in connection to the price of wool and cloth. They also 
elaborated on what business policies the concerned parties should follow in order 
to increase the price of Hungarian fleece. They collected their suggestions on 
appendix sheet 92157/1933, which, among others, listed suggestions such as 
increasing the influence of the state.36 
The Cartel Court took the examination results of the Price Analysation 
Council into account in the suit of Alkaloida.37 They wished to determine the price 
of narcotine by moderating.38 The Committee formed a specialised group while 
determining the prices. This group reached a decision after the acquisition of the 
necessary data and conducting hearings for the concerned parties.39 In the case of 
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the so-called “oil cartel”, they criticised the price and quality determined by the 
Committee. Quality assurance methods had to be established, as well.40 
In connection to the work of the Price Analysation Committee, a registry can 
be found amongst the archived materials, with a short description of price 
reduction for each and every commodity. This report specifically mentions white 
oils (paraffin, gasoline, diesel oil), lubricating oil, agricultural tools (i.e., axles, 
horseshoes, shovels), ironmongeries, machine lubricants, textbooks, linseed oil, 
pesticides, textile, cement.41 
As mentioned, the Secretary of Trade could give an order to the Legal Board 
to start a lawsuit of general interest. The plaintiff of these lawsuits was the Royal 
Legal Director, who always stood for the interests of the state and the general 
population. No single individual could become the plaintiff in such lawsuits.42 
It is also noteworthy that the outline of the Cartel Act would have given an 
opportunity for a competitor outside the cartel (a so-called outsider) to file a claim 
for a lawsuit of general interest. However, the counterargument was brought 
forward that outsiders would most likely try to secure their private interests by a 
lawsuit of general interest, and it would be “a direct harassment of the cartel, 
would learn and publish their business secrets, and their ultimate goal would be to 
enforce a bigger and bigger contingent for themselves, and also to join the cartel, 
and after that, would nullify the lawsuit which was started by them being the 
plaintiff”.43 But there were reasons for the outsiders to become plaintiffs, stating 
that this would have helped the detection of cartel abuses. The lawsuits filed 
against cartels could have been much more successful if these were started by 
outsiders. However, private and general interests were separated within the law 
proposal, so in the proposition submitted to the parliament, outsiders were not 
granted the right to become plaintiffs. Legislation accepted this viewpoint.44 
This meant that no interest of private law could be enforced in lawsuits of 
general interests. “The legal action of private law – public action – can only serve 
to protect and avoid the endangerment of the law, public morals, general interests, 
and by that, economy and the welfare of the public, and in order to do so, it shall 
not be used to serve personal interests”.45 In cases where individuals suffered 
private wrongs due to the operation of cartels, then a civil lawsuit, and not a 
lawsuit of general interest, was necessary. If, apart from his complaint, the 
operation of the cartel endangered general interests, the individual had the 
opportunity to draw the attention of the supervision and the ministry to this fact. 
After this, the ministry had to take the necessary legal actions.46 
The respondent of a lawsuit of general interest could be all of the concerned 
parties. In a case when a cartel was operating as a legal entity, then the respondent 
mostly became the cartel itself via a representative. The members of a cartel could 
also be included in the lawsuit as concerned parties. 
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If a cartel did not have a separate legal entity on its own, the legal action was 
taken against its members. In cases where a cartel had a sales office or 
administrative organisation functioning as a legal entity, or all of its transactions 
were fulfilled by the cooperation of a bank, then it was practical to include these in 
the lawsuit, as well, for most of the debatable legal actions were made under the 
names of these legal entities. This is why it became justified that the enforcement 
to discard the ban or actions could be carried into effect directly against these, as 
well.47 
There is a specific example for these in the contract in the case of the “bakery 
cartel”, where Paragraph No. 30 elaborates on the legal entity‟s jurisdiction and 
tasks. A bank was delegated to fulfil these tasks, and it did so by using its own 
name but by keeping the interests of the members of the contract in mind, so it “is 
legally bound in their name, and in case of becoming a plaintiff or a respondent, 
could act on its own, and practice all rights that is present for all concerned parties 
as individuals”.48 
The large headcount of the cartels could significantly make summoning more 
difficult, and could slow down the legal action. So if a cartel had a registered legal 
representative, the statement of claim had to be delivered to that individual. If 
there was no such person, then the head of the Cartel Court appointed a 
representative. If the representative accepted the statement of claim, it meant that 
all of the cartel members received and noted it. It was the obligation of the 
representative to notify each member of the cartel of the contents, each of whom 
could participate in the lawsuit with separate legal advisors. 
The proceedings of the Cartel Court were held with the basic principle that 
nobody with private interests can participate in them. As mentioned above, the 
concerned parties were represented by attorneys in the legal action. In cases of 
general interests, the action at law could only be filed against all participants, 





In the verdict – in case of amerce – the court always forbade a cartel or one of 
its members from continuing their operation, or the enforcement of an agreement 
or regulation, by a pecuniary fine. This is how a cartel was forced to discontinue 
its operations. The verdict did not state the size of the fine, the executive branch 
was tasked to establish that. The execution was asked by the Legal Board. The 
application had to be filed to the Cartel Court, and certify that the cartel or its 
members fulfilled their obligations as stated in the verdict. The Cartel Court 
determined the fine after a hearing with the amerced participant. During this, they 
had to take the wealth intended to be gained from the action and the financial 
status of the participant into account. The warrant that enacted the fine was a legal 
document also carrying executive powers, which were obligated by a judicial 
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The Cartel Policy in the Cartel Case Law 
 
A very specific area of Cartel Law was the Cartel Policy Law, which was 
closely connected to the state‟s power to oversee cartels, which meant nothing 
more or less than the protection of economy and public welfare. This procedure 
included the ordinary fining procedures.51 
According to Act XX of 1931, only those who failed to introduce the Cartel 
Settlement or the order could be punished by ordinary fines, and did not provide 
ample reason for this omission for those who did not obey the appeal for the 
examination of the case by the Secretary of Economy, all in all, failure to fulfil the 
duty to provide data, or obstructed the fulfilment of the appeal.52 Those who carry 
out appeals or settlements they were forbidden to do so by the Cartel Court, or 
manifest behaviour or carry out acts forbidden by the Cartel Court, are contained 
within the same framework. 
In the first two cases, the assigned courthouses were required to see the case 
through, which started the procedure according to the request of the legal director 
of the treasury based on the proposal of the secretary. In the third case, the Cartel 
Court was privy to the case, for it could establish a fining ex officio. The Cartel 
Court was assigned to the case if the fine was established repeatedly but 
unsuccessfully for a second and third time according to the motion of the Secretary 
of Economy, or in another lawsuit of general interest according to the motion of 
the legal director, if they wished to suggest proscription from trade or industry 
permanently, or for a pre-established period of time.53 
According to Harasztosi, none of his cases in fining procedures only the 
lawsuits concerning ordinary fines had any actual significance, especially if the 
presentation of a document was forgotten or was filed late; or in cases filed for 
omission of compulsory data presentation. In cases filed for the failure to oblige 
presentation duties, the matter of penalty fell under the rights of the assigned 
secretary. The confirmations filed to the secretary had no such effect, which 
vindicates the affair; the contestants could not achieve more with it than saving 
themselves from paying the ordinary fine.54 
In fining procedures started at courts of justice, the court had to use the rules 
in cases of trade delinquencies. This order of 68,400/1914.I.M. had to be taken 
into account.55 
In a case of ordinary fining procedures, no imprisonment could be ordered as 
a main rule, for the fine levied due to the failure to present a document could be 
                                                          
50Ranschburg (1931) at 108-109; Harasztosi  (1936) at 536; Varga (2016) at 660-669.   
51Harasztosi (1936) at 546-547; see  Varga (2017) at 13, 46-56. 
52Lőw (1935) at 350. 
53Lőw (1935) at 351; Dobrovics (1934a) at 10; Anon. (1935).   
54Harasztosi (1936) at 548; Lőw (1935a) at 352. 
551931:XX. tc. 15. §. 
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transformed into custodial sentences. There were specific cases where the fine 
could not be collected, but even then the Act had to specifically allow this 
transformation.56 
The legal director asked for the actuation of the procedure, and presented the 
agreement Mihály Schwarz, Mihály Menzer, and Ignácz Ádler, timber merchants 
from Kiskunhalas, made in 1933 according to Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel 
Procedural Law concerning timber, terracotta bricks, and pottery products. They 
introduced the cartel contract to the Secretary of Trade on 12th April, 1933; 
however, the list of pre-determined prices, which should have been one of the 
appendices of the contract, was only presented on the 4th May, 1933. In this case, 
the participants were late, and didn‟t even provide a justification for this. 
According to this, the Secretary of Trade ordered the legal directorate to actuate a 
case due to the failure to present a document. According to decree No. 
68400/1914. I. M., the legal directorate asked the Royal Court of Kalocsa to 
actuate a case against the aforementioned companies.57 
The fining procedure was heard by one of the orderly judges of the court of 
justice, who, as the presenter of the case, put the examination and trial aside to 
direct the attention of the complainants to the fact that the justifying statement had 
to be presented within 15 days after the appeal to do so was received. After this, 
the court decided on the appropriate penalty or the annulment of the case by taking 
into account the presented documents and the officially imparted information. The 
warrant established during the closed hearing was delivered to both the 
complainants and the royal legal directorate. According to this, the aforementioned 
decree presented role of public accuser to the royal prosecutor, but based on legal 
practices, this position was fulfilled by the legal director in such cases.58 
In the aforementioned lawsuit actuated by the Court of Kalocsa, the 
participants were asked to provide a document in proof.59 According to this, the 
complainants provided the document in proof, with which they wished to verify 
that they did not fail their duty to present documents, as established in the Act.60 
According to their document of proof, their opinion is that there was no sin of 
omission, for they didn‟t establish the appendix of the contract when they signed 
the contract, and after it was signed, they introduced it to the Secretary for 
inspection within the deadline.61 
Within 8 days after the delivery, they could turn to the assigned High Court 
against the decision. This affected the decision by having a postponing effect. Any 
individual who was thwarted in validating his or her individual rights in a lawsuit 
of the first or second degree, could file a document of proof. However, one could 
not file a document of proof because of an omission; the application for the 
                                                          
56See: Act X of 1928 article 16. 
57Cg. 187/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c. See: P. VI. 9489/16/1934 BFL, 13. P. 46341/3/1933. In: 
2746/1934 BFL, Cg. 35030/9. sz. In: 1158/1934 BFL., Cg. 33989/6/1932 In: 920/1933 BFL., 
Cg. 34592/4. sz. In: 4913/1933 BFL. 
58Harasztosi (1936) at 549. 
59Cg. 187/3/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c; see: 13. P. 46341/3/1933. In: 2746/1934 BFL 
60Cg. 187/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c. 
61Cg. 187/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c; see: Cg. 187/4/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c., Cg. 35030/9. 
sz. In: 1158/1934 BFL; Dobrovics (1934a) at 14. 
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document of proof had to be filed for the court of justice within 30 days of the 
established day of the trial or the expiration date of the failed legal remedy.62 
The formulaic rules of the application were under the effect of Paragraphs 
464-466 of the Criminal Code of Procedure. It had to be filed at the courthouse 
where the complainant failed to keep to the deadline. This application had to 
contain the reason for the delay and the justification information and data; the 
evidences that the court needed also had to be enclosed. If the matter was of the 
omission of an act of legal remedy, then the appointed court of the first degree 
turned the application over to the assigned higher court. In cases where the court 
made place for the document of proof, they, at the same time, also acted for the 
substitution of the omitted documents. The Court of Appeal had the power to 
come to an absolute decision in the case.63 
In the lawsuit filed against the companies Nagykovácsi Lime Factory 
Corporation and the Lime and Grout Sales Corporation, the complainants 
presented in their document of proof that the debated agreement was not made on 
20th March, 1933, for on this date, they only signed the draft of the contract. The 
court did not accept the statement presented in the document, and fined the 
complainants for breaking Paragraph No. 14 of the Cartel Procedural Law.64 
To find the bearings of a case, the court could order an examination if deemed 
necessary. In this case, the court selected an investigator from its own apparatus of 
judges and notaries. The duty of the investigator was to describe the bearings of 
the case, and based on this, the court of justice could order the termination or the 
continuation of said legal action. In order to do so, the investigator interrogated the 
complainant, and acquired all documents and evidences necessary to clarify the 
bearings of the case.65 
The rules of Bp. were deemed valid during the interrogation of witnesses and 
experts.66 The court or the investigator could absolve any business associate from 
clarifying any circumstance which was not deemed vital to the examination or the 
case, yet would result in business secrets that are not necessary for the trial to 
come to light. If the investigator deemed it necessary, he could ask for a court 
order for an audit. This procedure was only valid if it was deemed necessary to 
ascertain the omission or act under investigation. If the procedural step could only 
be fulfilled by the means of writ, it was necessary to turn to the assigned County 
Court. The court of justice could order the investigator to continue or terminate the 
investigation.67 
To uphold common welfare, the legal directorate could oversee the 
inspection, and because of this, it could examine the investigation documents, and 
could file a proposal to the investigator to continue or terminate the investigation, 
or could file a proposal to the court of justice to debate the investigator‟s 
regulations. The latter two were within the complainant‟s rights, as well, who 
                                                          
62Harasztosi (1936) at 549. 
63Harasztosi (1936) at 549. 
64Cg. 35537/3 in 5812/1934. BFL; Lőw (1935) at 354; Dobrovics (1935b) at 12; Dobrovics 
(1934b) at 13. 
65Harasztosi (1936) at 550. 
66Cg. 35030/9. sz. In: 1158/1934 BFL; Dobrovics (1934b) at 15. 
67Harasztosi (1936) at 550. 
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could select a defence attorney even during the investigation, whose rights were 
also determined by the Bp. The defence attorney could only be one of the 
practicing legal experts, one who was registered at one of the Bar Associations.68 
The complainant had no right to intervene or propose during the examination 
or the rest of the procedure, could not form a statement or get legal remedy. 
However, he or she was free to introduce any circumstance to the investigator, the 
court of justice, or Court of Appeal, which could move the examination of the 
omission or illegal activity forward or assist the verification. If he was not selected 
to appear as witness, he could press for this, and the court of justice and the Court 
of Appeal were obliged to enact this, with the added burden of nullifying. 
After the examination was finished, the investigator sent the documents to the 
court of justice. Based on these documents, the court could order the termination 
or the continuation of the legal action. The court stated the termination of a legal 
procedure in a warrant. In any other case, a term had to be set in order to continue 
the case orally. In cases when the act or malpractice fell under the effect of 
criminal law, the legal action had to be transferred to a Criminal Court.69 
A case was filed against the Chinoin Pharmaceutical and Chemical Factory 
Corporation for breaking Paragraphs No. 2 and 14 of the Cartel Procedural Law, 
and thus committing cartel malpractice; it took place at the court of justice of 
Budapest, where the court of the second degree reached a warrant, specified as No. 
35779/2, but was turned to a higher court by the legal directorate, yet it was 
rejected by the Court of Appeal, and in their warrant, they pointed out Paragraph 
No. 1 of the 5th Act of 1878, according to which an act can only be considered a 
crime or a delinquency if the Act considers it as such.70 In such cases, Criminal 
Courts should proceed. 
The court could order the legal action to move forward, if the bearings of the 
case were clear. Before this, the complainant was asked to make a statement with a 
15-day deadline.71 
In the warrant ordaining the trial, the act or malpractice encumbering the 
complainant had to be stated, with the exact place of a specific provision under the 
law. 
At the same time, the court of law was assigned with the task to provide a 
warrant to appear to all contestants, witnesses, and experts. They could even issue 
a warrant to appear for those participants who were announced after the beginning 
of the trial by any of the contestants. The complainant had to be warned that if he 
or she chooses not to appear, this non-attendance does not obstruct the 
continuation and discussion of the case; he was free to hire a legal representative to 
take place in the case.72 The arrival of the subpoena and the beginning of the trial 
had to be at least 15 days apart. During trials, if the complainant was a natural 
person, he or she could not be apprehended, committed into custody, or put in 
                                                          
68Harasztosi (1936) at 551. 
69Harasztosi (1936) at 551. 
70P. VI. 8146/4/1934. BFL. 
71Harasztosi (1936) at 551. 
72Cg. 187/2/1933. sz. BKML. VII. 2. c. 
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detention awaiting trial. This was a significant difference between this and a 
criminal legal action.73 
The beginning of the trial was marked by reading out the warrant that 
ordained it, and after that, the judge summarized the case. The trial could be held 
even if the contestants failed to appear. The witnesses and experts could be 
ordered to step forward, and, in order for them to do so, the trial could be 
interrupted for a few hours. 
After this, the president could interrogate the present complainant in 
connection to the act or malpractice, and the members of the judicial board, the 
president of the legal department, and the defence attorney could ask their 
questions.74 After these, verification was recorded. 
After verification was finished, the president of the legal department 
introduced his proposal to the court, followed by the defence attorney and, finally, 
the complainant. There was no place for any other discussion in this section of the 
legal action. In cases where the contestants failed to appear, the judge introduced 
and described the evidence.75 
The publicity of the trial was under the rules written down in Bp. The court 
could order the exclusion of the public in order to preserve business secrets. The 
rules written down in Bp. were also valid in connection to the development of the 
trial and maintaining order.76 
During the fining procedure filed against the Textile Factory of Győr 
Corporation, the Textile Industry of Soroksár Corporation, and Mózes Freudinger 
and Sons Corporation, the royal court of Budapest considered the minutes of 18th 
February, 1931 as evidence, and according to this, they determined that the 
complainants were present in the general assembly on the raw material agreement, 
and these individuals “report their inclusion to the raw material agreement, since 
up to that point, their inclusion was based on gentlemen‟s agreement”.77 The court 
considered this unwritten gentlemen‟s agreement to fall under Act No. 1 of the 
Cartel Procedural Law. 
The court judged the circular letter on the same merit, when it stated that it is 
a regulation in itself that should have been presented to the Secretary of Trade, 
“for it obviously serves the purpose that the individuals who wrote it down and 
signed it could sell their merchandise at a higher price, and thus limit the economic 
competition in connection to the formation of prices”.78 
The court considered the fact that the agreement formed by Rezső Vágó 
Corporation and the Hungarian Timber Corporation was not presented to the court 
in time, for it only fell under the effect of Paragraph No. 1 of the Cartel Procedural 
Law after the P. IV. 5261/1932 verdict of the Cartel Court as an extenuating 
circumstance. The court stated that “The decrees of the Cartel Procedural Law are 
not only valid for cartel contracts, but also establish the duty to present any sort of 
                                                          
73Harasztosi (1936) at 551. 
74Harasztosi (1936) at 552. 
75Harasztosi (1936) at 552. 
76Lőw (1935) at 354. 
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agreement which, in connection to merchandise, establishes any sort of limitation 
or regulation duty to the economic competition, both in the matters of circulation 
or price formation, so, even a delivery contract can fall under the regulations of 
Act No. 20 of 1931”.79 
After the trial was finished, the court of justice could either terminate the 
proceedings or could determine that the complainant was guilty and describe the 
appropriate punishment in its warrant. In both cases, the order needed reasoning. 
The proposal of the legal director did not bind the court in any way. The fine had 
to be executed with a 15-day deadline.80 
The legal director established a similar procedure against the Sándor Angyalfi 
Asphalt and Tar Industry Corporation, János Biehn, Grozit Asphalt and Tar 
Chemical Products Corporation, Tivadar Helvey, DSc, Manó Kallós Ferenc Kollár 
and Co., Hungarian Asphalt Corporation, Posnánszky and Strelitz, and Hungarian 
Cover Panel Factory purchaser and sales cooperative due to cartel elision.81 The 
royal court of Budapest stated in its warrant that the complainants are guilty, for 
the agreement which elongated the contract that expired on the 28th February, 
1934, was only presented after the deadline, so, belatedly.82 The court stated that 
“According to Paragraph No. 2 of the 20th Act of 1931, any agreement which 
modifies or regulates the economic competition, modifies and elongates he 
original, or any necessarily written agreement that falls under Paragraph No. 1 of 
the Cartel Procedural Law should be presented within 15 days after the 
establishment of the agreement. According to this mandate, it is not enough to just 
report the agreement, but a written form of the agreement had to be filed for the 
Royal Secretary of Trade of Hungary for registration.”83 
In another case, the court of justice of Budapest terminated the procedure 
against the complainants, for it turned out that the agreement was presented before 
the deadline, since the court established that the formation of a cartel agreement is, 





To sum it all up, according to the sources available in archives, most cartel 
cases were judicial proceedings. It can be stated that the special nature of the rules 
of these proceedings was unique in the Hungarian Code of Civil Procedures, for 
the civil courthouses made their decisions in a case of civil law by using the rules 
of the Code of Criminal Action. After the turn of the century, the economic 
changes started processes in both the field of legal life and legal sciences, and as a 
result of this, a demand arose to legally codify any rules in connection to cartels. 
The foundations of these were found in private law, especially in the regulations of 
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the commercial law, which could be further elaborated upon and lead to 
development of the regulations on the annulment of contracts in connection to 
dishonourable business competition. Beyond the creation of the technical legal 
regulations, the establishment of certain judicatory institutions was inevitable in 
order to enforce these. This is how the Cartel Court and the Cartel Committee 
became one of the most decisive legal institutions in economic life up until the 
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